EDITORIAL by unknown
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Published monthly during the Academic Year by Yale Law Studentswith Advice and Assistance from Members of Faculty
SUBSCRIPTION PRICE, $2.50 A YEAR SINGLE COPIES, 35 CENTS
EDITORIAL BOARD
JOHN E. HALLN, Editor-in-ChiefSmINEY W. DAviDsoN, Secretary HUBmT STARR, Book Rev. Ed.WxLLIM A. KELLY, 2D, Business Mgr. GEORGE L. KIR.A~msMORRIS BLUmER KARL N. LLEWELLyNMIuAR S. BiEcxEN=GE JAMEs N. MENDENHALLCHARLus S. BRODY ROBERT L. SENGLELouis FEiNm x I. HARRY SLVERSTONEFRED C. HEssErwmyER STANLEY 3. TRACESxI
GEORGE E. WooDnEu
EDITORS IN WAR SERVICE
STEPHEN F. DuNN (Editor-in-Chief)
RALPH W. DAVIS RoBEar PFLIEGER
CONTRIBUTING ALUMNI EDITORSHERScHRL W. ARANT Trom~s P. HARDMANCLARENCE E. BARTON ALBE.r J. H.mpoCHARLEs E. CLARx HARKsoN HEwITrWILLIAM W. GAGER CARRoLL R. WARD
Canadian subscription price is $3.oo a year; foreign, $3.2 a year.If a subscriber wishes his copy of the JouRNAL discontinued at the expiration of his sub-scription, notice to that effect should be sent; otherwise, it is assumed that a continuationof the subscription is desired.
THE FORMATION OF A UNILATERAL CONTRACT
The important distinctions between unilateral and bilateral contracts
are slowly coming to be recognized. The case of Brackenbury V.
Hodgkin (1917, Me.) 1O2 Atl. io6 affords an excellent opportunity
for setting forth some of these distinctions.' The exact words used
by the parties are not given in the opinion, but the facts are reported
by the court substantially as follows: The defendant wrote a letter to,her son-in-law, the plaintiff, offering that if he would move from
Missouri to Maine and would care for the defendant during her life,
he should have the ownership of the home place after the defend-
ant's death and the use of it during her life. The plaintiff moved asrequested and cared for the defendant for a few weeks. Trouble
ensued, caused, as the court finds, by the unreasonable demands and
bad disposition of the defendant, whereupon she conveyed the premises
'Two other recent cases of unilateral contracts, involving the problem of
Shadwell v. Shadwell (i86o) 9 C. B. N. S. i59, are discussed at length in this
number in an article at page 362.
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to her son-a co-defendant. The plaintiff filed a bill in equity to
compel a reconveyance from the son to his mother, to restrain the
prosecution of a statutory ejectment suit brought by the son, and to
obtain a decree that the mother should hold the land in trust for the
plaintiff. The relief asked was granted in full.
The court says: "The offer was the basis, not of a bilateral con-
tract, requiring a reciprocal promise, a promise for a promise, but
of a unilateral contract requiring an act for a promise. . . . The
plaintiff here accepted the offer by moving from Missouri to the
mother's farm in Lewiston and entering upon the performance of 
the
specified acts .... The existence of a completed and valid contract
is clear."
In this case the defendant was the offeror, and by her letter she
created in the plaintiff the power to form a contract between them 
by
accepting.2 What was this power and how was it to be exercised?
The defendant has clearly offered to undertake the duty of allowing
the plaintiff to enjoy the use of certain lands during her life and 
of
conveying to him the fee therein at her death. Did she in return
ask the plaintiff to promise to support her until her death? No such
promise was asked for in express terms, nor was such a promise
expressly made. Nevertheless, it would not be unreasonable to find
an implication of such a promise both in the offer and in the acceptance.
In such case, the contract would be bilateral, for each of the parties
would be undertaking to perform certain acts in the future. The
contract would include mutual rights and mutual duties. The act of
the plaintiff in moving to Maine might have been understood by both
parties as an expression of an intention to undertake the duty of
supporting the defendant during her life; that is, this act would be 
a
promissory act. If such was the fact, the decision is justifiable; for
the contract was fully completed,--the requested promissory accept-
ance had been given, and the offeror had knowledge of it.
The court expressly holds, however, that the contract was unilateral.
This means that the plaintiff was requested to make no promise, either
by words or by other action. He undertook no duty for breach of
which he would be bound to pay damages. He could have abandoned
the place in Maine and ceased to support the defendant, without
committing any breach of contract. Does it not follow from this
that the defendant was not bound, either, and still had the power and
privilege of revoking her offer?
Suppose the words of the defendant were as follows: "I promise
to convey my land to you in return for your moving to Maine and
caring for me during my life." Such words as these indicate that the
'For a discussion of the whole subject of the formation of contract from the
present writer's point of view, see Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and
Some of the Resulting Legal Relations (1917) 26 YA.E LAw JouRxAL, i69.
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power of the offeree can be exercised only by a long series of acts
extending through the entire life of the defendant. Acceptance would
not be complete, and the contract would not be formed, until the
instant of the defendant's death.8 Could not the defendant, therefore,
at any time prior to her death and prior to complete acceptance, revoke
her offer by giving notice to the plaintiff? In general, an offer is
supposed to be revocable prior to acceptance. The present case indi-
cates how very inequitable such a revocation might be.4 A quasi-
contractual adtion for quantum meruit would not do justice; for the
defendant has received only a few weeks' support; and to recover
the value of this would not compensate the plaintiff for breaking up
his home in Missouri and moving to Maine. In many cases, a very
simple remedy would be to hold that the plaintiff's power of accept-
ance is irrevocable after the plaintiff has done some substantial act in
part performance of the requested acceptance. In the present case,
however, the plaintiff is deprived of the physical power to accept, even
though he may still have the legal power. Readiness to support is
not the same as actual support and is not the specified acceptance. 5
Perhaps, the chief criticism of the suggested rule of irrevocability is
that it operates with too great severity against the offeror.
There is a third possible assumption in the present case. Suppose
the defendant said: "I promise to convey my land to you in return
for your moving to Maine, and on condition that you support me dur-
ing my life." This, too, is an offer of a unilateral contract. The agreed
equivalent for the defendant's promise is the plaintiff's action in
'It might be questioned whether in such a case the formation of a contract is
possible, for the reason that death would revoke the offer. Surely, however, no
court would give weight to such a suggestion. Even if the offer is revocable
(and it probably is not), the acceptance is complete, and the revocation by death
does not take effect prior to the completion of the acceptance. If it be true
that two living persons are necessary to make a contract, in this case there were
two living persons during the entire period of formation. To adopt the opposite
view would be worse than medieval casuistry.
'It has been vigorously denied that the revocation is inequitable and as firmly
asserted that no offer can be irrevocable. See I. Maurice Wormser, The True
Conception of Unilateral Contracts (Ig16) 26 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 136, follow-
ing Langdell, Summary of the Law of Contracts (i88o) secs. 4, 178. In support
of the text above, see the article cited in note 2, supra.5 It appears to be the opinion of the New York Court of Appeals in DeCicco
v. Schweizer (1917, N. Y.) 117 N. E. 8o7, that the requested act must be
completed before a contract results. "Until marriage occurred the defendant
was not bound. It would not have been enough that the count remained willing
to marry." Similarly, a part performance with readiness to complete was
held insufficient in Pain v. Bastwick (I62I) Cro. Jac. 583. Yet in the present
case the court seems to think it enough that the plaintiff "remained willing" to
support the defendant during her life.
' Such severity could be avoided as suggested in 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, pp.
195, 196.
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moving to Maine.7 The support of the defendant during her life is
a condition precedent to the plaintiff's right to an immediate con-
veyance. The supposed "contract" is formed upon the plaintiff's
arrival in Maine, and thereafter it is too late for the defendant to
revoke her offer. It is probable that this was the view that was
actually held by the court. In this view the acts of moving to Maine
operate to create new legal relations called contract. These relations
would include the right not to be disturbed in possession of the home
place, the privilege of occupying that place, and the legal power to
create a right to the fee by supporting the defendant during her life.
These relations were all irrevocable by the defendant. As a correla-
tive to the plaintiff's conditional right to the fee, there would be the
conditional duty of the defendant to cause such acts to be done as
will convey the fee. The acts of the plaintiff in supporting the
defendant for life are facts subsequent to the formation of the con-
tract (the preceding relations), and precedent to the plaintiff's right
to an immediate conveyance of the fee.
In cases of this sort, the parties may not be at all clear in their
own minds as to the legal relations that they desire to create; and
the court must determine the legal relations, not because the parties
clearly assented to them but because they willed to do certain acts
that ought to result in such legal relations." If the court holds that
the legal relations are as above, the remedy in the present case was
a proper one. The decree is one for specific reparation and specific
performance. The defendant is ordered not to disturb the plaintiff's
possession; also to hold the fee in trust for the plaintiff. Whether
or not the plaintiff will ever be entitled to a conveyance of the fee is
a question yet to be determined. His right to such a conveyance is
conditional upon support of the defendant during the rest of her life.
It does not seem probable that the plaintiff will be able to fulfil this
condition after the litigation and ill-will between him and the defend-
ant. Of course, it will be the defendant who is causing the non-
fulfillment of this condition; but a court of equity would hardly
compel her to continue to live with the plaintiff. She has perhaps
promised by implication that she would not prevent the plaintiff from
fulfilling the conditions; but even if her conduct is a breach of this
'In this case, also, the problem just discussed above is involved; for the
defendant might telegraph her revocation after the plaintiff had sold his home
and started for Maine. If the defendant had sent such a telegram the court
would no doubt have pushed the moment of acceptance still further back In
Martilt v. Mdes (190) 179 Mass. 114, 6o N. E. 397 Mr. Justice Holmes said: "If
necessary, we should assume that the first substantial act done by the committee
was all that was required in the way of acts to found the defendant's obligation."
'Perhaps this is a further step in the development away from contract back
to status. Cf. Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts (917) 27 YALE
LAw JoURNAl, 34.
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implied promise or is tortious, it does not follow that the plaintiff
should get the entire compensation without rendering any of the
service. This is a separate problem. It may be, however, that the
present decree will eventually result in the plaintiff's obtaining the
fee, on the theory of constructive service and on the ground that
the defendant has waived the condition by preventing its fulfillment.
A. L. C.
cGOING VALUE" FOR PURPOSES OF RATE REGULATION
A recent California case raises in an interesting form the much
disputed question, when or to what extent "going value" is value
upon which a public utility is entitled to base its rates. San foaquin
Light & Power Corp. v. Railroad Commission (1917, Cal.) 165 Pac.
i6. It is generally admitted that "going value" is, to some extent
at least, an item of value for rate purposes,1 but there is much
confusion with respect to the questions when and to what extent it
constitutes such value.2 In the latest ruling on the subject by the
United States Supreme Court' it was held that "going value" is "a
property right and should be considered in determining the value of
the property upon which the owner has a right to make a fair return."
This holding, it seemed at first, had practically settled the whole
conflict; for, inasmuch as the Supreme Court is, under the Constitu-
tion, the court of last resort upon the question of valuation for rate-
making purposes,4 it was to be supposed that other tribunals would
follow the Supreme Court upon this question. On the contrary, how-
ever, there has been a tendency on the part of many authorities to
construe away the apparent effect of the Supreme Court's decision.
A striking illustration of this tendency is the California case above
cited. In that case the court affirmed the decision of a commission5
in which, it seems, no. allowance whatever was made for "going
. 'Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines (1915) 238 U. S.',53; People v.
Wilcox (1914) 21o N. Y. 479, 1O4 N. E. g91; Public Service Gas Co. v. Board
of Commissioners (1913, Sup: Ct) 89 N. J. L. 463, 87 At. 651. See Beale &
Wyman, Railroad Rate Regulation (2d ed.) secs. 276, 28o.
'Hermann v. Newtown Gas Co. (1916, N. Y. P. S. C., Ist Dist) P. U.R. 1916 D,
825; People v. Wilcox, supra; Rich v. Biddeford, etc. Co. (1917, Me. P. U. C.)
P. U. R. 1917 C, 982; Appleton Waterworks Co. v. Railroad Commission (1913)
154 Wis. x2I, 142 N. W. 476; Re Clarksburg Light & Heat Co. (1916, W. Va.
P. S. C.) P. U. R., 1917 A, 577; East Bakersfield, etc. Association v. San Joaquin
etc. Corporation (1916, Cal. R. C.) P. U. R. 1916 C, 380 (the principal case
before the Commission); and numerous other cases. See Whitten, Valuation
of Public Service Corporations, sees. 55o-644.
. Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, supra.
4Public Service Gas Co. v. Board of Commissioners, supra.
'East Bakersfield, etc. Association v. San Joaquin, etc. Corporation, supra.
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value."" The reason assigned for the exclusion is that the utility's
excessive earnings had been sufficient to offset all past deficits. As
the opinion expressly purports to follow the above mentioned Supreme
Court decision, the question thus raised by the case is reduced to this:
May "going value" under the Supreme Court doctrine be wiped out
by subsequent earnings?
The passage in the Supreme Court's opinion, upon which the recent
cases rely, is as follows:
"Included in going value as usually reckoned is the investment neces-
sary to organizing and establishing the business, which is not em-
braced in the value of its actual physical property.. . . For aught that
appears in this record these expenses ["overhead charges"] may have
been already compensated in rates charged and collected under
former ordinances . . . and it is not to be presumed, without proof,
that a company is ulder the necessity of making up losses and expendi-
tures incidental to the experimental stage of the business."
7
These cases, however, fail to notice that the Supreme Court, not-
withstanding its language, did not exclude these expenses. In fact
the above-quoted passage is only a dictum, for the point was not
squarely before the court. Besides, the court, by negative inference,
ultimately approved the allowance of these expenses.
Can the doctrine of these cases, then, be supported upon principle?
In order to answer this question it will first be necessary to determine
definitely just what "going value" is, for' it seems that the whole
conflict and confusion on the subject is dile fundamentally to a con-
fused conception of the nature of the thing in question. What, then,
is "going value?" As was pointed out in one of the latest cases,
"experts, courts and commissions" do not agree as to what this
"elusive, intangible and troublesome" thing is.
8  The United States
Supreme Court, however, has supplied a definition which sufficiently
expresses the general principle involved. "Going value" that court
defines as "the value which inheres in a plant where its business is
'The language of the commission is somewhat ambiguous, but both the court
and the commission expressly purport to follow the above mentioned decision of
the United States Supreme Court, and the Commission expressly states that
the development cost has been wiped out by later earnings and that the United
States "Supreme Court clearly intimates that if the expense of organizing and
establishing the business has already been made good to the utility out of later
rates no additional allowance for 'going coftcern value' may properly be made
in a rate case." At any rate both the court and the Commission excluded the
whole "item of development cost," estimated, by the deficit method, at
$1,651,021.
I Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, supra, at p. 165.
'Re Indianapolis Water C6. (i917, Ind. P. S. C.) P. U. R. 1917 E, 556. A very
illuminating and thorough discussion of the subject is contained in the report of
Hon. H. M. Wright, Master in Chancery, in Spring Valley Water Co. v. City &
County of San Francisco, now pending in U. S. Dist. Ct. N. D. Cal.
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established, as distinguished from one which has yet to establish its
business."9  "Going value," then, is the difference between the value
of a plant considered as a whole in its present condition and the sum
of the values of the various component parts of the plant, considerfed
as a "non-going" or static plant with its business and operating
system yet to establish. It is indisputable that this added element is
a thing of value; but just what does this value represent? It is,
apart from "good will," the present representative of the time and
effort spent in transforming the static "bare bones" of the plant into
the present "going" concern. It is clear, then, that the utility must.
in some way be compensated for this expenditure. It is settled, how-
ever, that "good-will" value, though a part of "going value" as above
defined, is not value for purposes of rate regulation.' The ulti-
mate question, then, is whether this remaining part of "going value"
may be offset by subsequent earnings.
In the first place it is clear that this "going-concern" element,
when once it is created, is a continuous instrument of production,
i. e., it continues from year to year a permanent item of value which,
without further outlay, brings in its annual return. Hence, this part
of the "going value," possessing, as it does, the distinguishing char-
acteristic of capital expenditure, constitutes a part of the capital value
of the plant. In the second place, the doctrine of these recent cases
allows this capital value to be wuiped out by subsequent earnings. But
if this capital value may be wiped out by later earnings, then by the
same reasoning all items of capital value may be wiped out by later
earnings, and, therefore, if a utility is allowed to charge sufficient
excessive rates the plant's total capital value would be wiped out,
and the utility would have to serve the public gratuitously-an absurd
conclusion which would seem to establish the fallacy of the doctrine."-
It would seem, therefore, that the above mentioned part of "going
value" is always value for purposes of rate regulation, and that cases
which make "going value" depend in whole or in part upon the
existence of past deficits, or allow "going value" to be offset by
subsequent earnings, proceed upon an erroneous theory as to the
fundamental nature of this item of value.
" T. P. H.
'Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, supra, at p. 165.
" WilIcox v. Consolidated Gas Co. (19o9) 212 U. S. ig. See Wyman, Public
Service Corporations (2d ed.) sec. 11o2.
'That past rates and earnings, though, excessive, may not be considered in
fixing present rates, see Kindell v. Adans Express Co. (19o8) 13 I. C. C. 475,
490; Bluefield v. Bluefield Water-works, etc. Co. (1917, W. Va. P. S. C.) P. U. R.
1917 E, 22, 32. See also Beale & Wyman, Railroad Rate Regulation (2d ed.)
sec. 271.
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CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS ARISING FROM BREACHE OF EXPRESS ORAL TRUSTS
OF LAND
A recent Washington case raises the troublesome question of the
rights of proposed beneficiaries under an oral trust of land. A hus-
band by will left real estate to his wife. At the time of the execution
of the will it was orally agreed that the wife, if she survived the
husband, should have the use of the property for her life, holding it
intact until her death, at which time it should be divided equally
among their children. The wife conveyed the property to one of the
children. It was held that the other child had no enforceable interest
in the property. Brown. v. Kausche (1917, Wash.) 167 Pac. 1075.
In reaching this decision the court professed to follow the settled
law of Washington, relying upon prior cases in which it had been
held that there was no enforceable trust where land was conveyed
by absolute deed but upon an oral agreement by the grantee to reconvey
to the grantor. In order to determine whether the decisions relied
upon by the Washington court were really in point, it is necessary to
distinguish more carefully than the court did between different types.
of cases. They may be grouped under three general heads: (I)
transfers inter vivos on oral trusts for the grantor; (2) transfers
inter vivos on oral trusts for others than the grantor; (3) gifts by
will.
In the first of these groups the authorities in the United States, with
hardly a dissenting voice, refuse to recognize that the grantor has
an enforceable interest in the property." On the other hand, the
modem English rule recognizes a "constructive" trust, based upon
the principle that one who refuses to perform an express oral agree-
ment must restore either what he received or its value.2 In some
cases the result is, of course, to require the grantee to do exactly
what he orally agreed to do. This coincidence need not blind us to
the real basis for the decision, any more than when the action is brought
at law on a quasi-contract where an express oral contract within
the statute of frauds has been broken by the defendant after perform-
ance by the plaintiff.8 It seems clear that the American courts are
'Titcomb v. Morrill (1865, Mass.) IO Allen, i5. For numerous cases in
accord, see the note in 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 906. In at least one jurisdiction the
grantor is permitted to recover the value of the land at law. Cromwell v.
Norton (19o6) 193 Mass. 291.
'Davies v. Otty (1865) 35 Beav. 2o8; Haigh v. Kaye (1872) L. R. 7 Ch. App.
469; In re Duke of Marlborough [1894] 2 Ch. 133. There is a tendency in a few
American jurisdictions to adopt the English rule. See Taylor v. Morris (1912)
163 Cal. 717, 127 Pac. 66; Bowler v. Curler (I89i) 21 Nev. 158, 26 Pac. 226;
and other cases cited in 12 MicH. L. REV. 527, note 64. In many cases, however,
the court relies on a "special confidential relation."
8 For citation of authorities, see Woodward, The Law of Quasi-Contracts,
Chap. VI.
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guilty of failing to recognize what is after all a very simple applica-
tion of ordinary equitable principles, obviously being misled by the
coincidence referred to. The almost universally recognized rule that
an absolute deed may be shown by extrinsic evidence to have been
given to secure the payment of money seems to be based upon a more
or less unconscious recognition of the same equitable principle.'
In the second and third groups of cases, however, a different prob-
lem is presented, since the trust is for persons other than the grantor
or testator. Granting that the express oral trust is unenforceable,
does the principle applied in the first group of cases enable us 'to
impose a "constructive" trust obligation upon the grantee or devisee
in favor of the proposed beneficiary? So far as the authorities go,
this question is usually answered in the negative for the second group5
and in the affirmative for the third.8 If all that we have is a failure
to keep an express oral agreement to hold in trust for third persons,
it seems difficult to find any basis for raising a "constructive" trust
on behalf of the proposed beneficiaries on the theory that the grantee
or devisee otherwise will be unjustly enriched at their expense, unless
we at least tacitly assume that these beneficiaries have been deprived
of something to which they were in some way or other entitled-which
is, of course, to assume just what we are trying to establish. Never-
theless, as stated, in the third group of cases the authorities (outside
of Washington) are very nearly unanimous in imposing a so-called
"constructive" trust on behalf of the intended beneficiary. A typical
argument is that of Cardozo, J., in a recent decision in New York.
"The principle is now a settled one in this state that where a devise
is induced by the promise, express or implied, of the devisee, to devote
the gift to a lawful purpose, a secret trust is created; and equity will
compel him to apply the property in accordance with the promise by
force of which he procured it. . . . A court of equity in such cases
exerts its power, not merely because there has been a breach of con-
tract, but because the promise has been used as an instrument to induce
the promisee to part with his property, so that the retention of it by
the promisor in violation of the promise would result in an unjust
"The opinions of the courts are not as a rule very clear as to the real basis
for this doctrine, and many apparently believe it to be purely anomalous. Typical
cases are: Linkemann v. Knepper (19o7) 226 Ill. 473, 8o N. E. ioog; Campbell
v. Dearborn (1872) iog Mass. 130.
5Lantry v'. Lantry (1869) 51 Ill. 458. Some authorities are contra, e. g., Fox v.
Fox (i9o6) 77 Neb. 6oi, Iio N. W. 3o4. For other authorities in accord and
contra, see the note in 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 906; also 12 MicH. L. REy. 442, notes
27 and 28. In Ahrens v. Jones (19o2) 169 N. Y. 555, 62 N. E. 666, the grantor
executed the conveyance while on his death bed and the court enforced the oral
trust, apparently assimilating the case to those in group three.
'Riordan v. Bannon (187I) Ir. Rep. IO 3q. 469; Curdy v. Berton (1889). 79
Cal. 420, 21 Pac. 858. For other authorities in accord see the note in 39 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 9o6.
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enrichment and would constitute a fraud. It is not the promise only,
nor the breach only, but the promise and the breach combined with
the extortion of property from the owner upon the faith of the
engagement, which puts the court in motion."
'7
Undoubtedly decisions of this kind appeal to our sympathy, for the
only alternative is to impose a constructive trust for the heir of the
testator, who in many cases turns out to be identical with the devisee,
and who, in any event, is not likely to carry out the testator's wishes.
It is, however, difficult to reconcile them with the plain language of
the statutes, and it is equally hard to see why, if we are to be cori-
sistent, the same result must not be reached where the land is trans-
ferred by deed instead of by will.8
It has indeed been suggested that in the second and third groups
a distinction should be drawn between the mere breach of an oral
agreement made in good faith and the obtaining of the gift by means
of a promise made in bad faith, i. e., one made with no intention to
perform and for the purpose of obtaining the property. This distinc-
tion has, to some extent, been followed in the American authorities
dealing with transfers inter vivos on oral trusts for third persons,9
but not where the gift is by will. If the statutes of frauds and wills
are to be enforced in letter and in spirit, even in the case of bad faith
referred to, it seems questionable whether anything more than damages.
for a tort should be given to the proposed beneficiary. That in a
suitable case a tort liability in damages should be recognized for
diverting from the plaintiff property which would otherwise have
come to him by inheritance or devise, seems dear. See (1917) 27
YALE LAw JOURNAL, 263. To create for the proposed beneficiary
an equitable interest in the property, however, under pretence of
giving specific reparation for a tort, seems in essence to be nothing
more than the enforcement of the oral trust which is forbidden by the
statutes. For this reason the decision of the Washingtbn court in
the principal case, opposed as it is to the general current of the
authorities, seems to be: based on sound principles. It is to be hoped,
however, that the Washington court, and the American courts in
" Golland v. Golland (1914, Sup. Ct) 84 Misc. Rep. 299; 147 N. Y. Supp. 263,
267.
. Professor George P. Costigan, Jr., in his exhaustive treatment of the whole
subject in 28 H~Av. L. REv. 237, 28 ibid. 366, argues (p. 266) that the courts
should recognize a constructive trust in both cases. See also the same author's
discussion in 12 MicH. L. Rnv. 427, 12 ibid. 514.
'Crossman v. Keister (i9o6) 221 Ill. 69, 79 N. E. 58. This distinction was
approved by the late Professor James Barr Ames. See his essay upon Construc-
tive Trusts Based upon the Breach of an Express Oral Trust of Land, in his
Lectures on Legal History, 425, 430. The same result is reached where the con-
veyance is solicited, or where there is a violation of some "special confidential
relationship." The authorities are collected by Professor Costigan in 12 MIcHr.
L. REv. 442, and note 29.
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general, will ultimately come to recognize and enforce a constructive
trust on behalf of a grantor who has conveyed on an oral trust for
himself.
IMMUNITIES OF DIPLOMATIC OFFICERS
A recent English case, Re Suarez (1917, Ch. D.) 117 L. T. 239,
again emphasizes the privileged position with respect to judicial pro-
cess held by diplomatic officers of foreign governments accredited
to England. In that case the Bolivian Minister to Great Britain
acted unofficially as administrator of the estate of a fellow-national.
There being a balance due on his account as such administrator, the
plaintiff, as beneficiary of the estate, sought to have a writ of seques-
tration issued against property of the defendant which was not neces-
sary to maintain his personal comfort or dignity as Minister. Although
the Minister had waived his diplomatic immunity from suit, the Court
held that no writ of execution could issue against any of his property,
in view of the Diplomatic Privileges Act' which declared null and
void all writs and processes sued out against the person or property of
public Ministers.
The immunities of diplomatic officers are extended to them in their
official character of state agents and are enjoyed by them as repre-
sentatives of their sovereigns. The immunity from civil process
belongs technically to the Minister's State and does not vest in him
personally, and it has been held that, in principle, a diplomatic officer
is incompetent to waive it.2 The immunities mentioned extend to his
family and to the members of his official household.3 Nor do these
expire, according to the better opinion, with the cessation of his func-
tions; but they are retained for a reasonable time after he has pre-
sented his letters of recall.4  It seems also that an ambassador is
immune from arrest on civil process while traveling through a third
state to which he is not accredited.5 Some of the customary diplo-
matic immunities, particularly the immunity from judicial process,
have in many countries found legislative expression in municipal
statutes.6
'Act of i7o8 (7 Anne c. 12).
2 United States v. Benner (183o, U. S. C. C. Pa.) I Baldwin 234.
'Lockwood v. Coysgarne (1765, K. B.) 3 Burr. 1676; Respublica v. DeLong-
champs (1784, Pa. 0. & T.) i Dall. iii.
'D'Azambuja v. Pereira (183o, U. S. D. C. Pa.) i Miles 366; Contra, Marshall
v. Critico (18o8, K. B.) 9 East 447.
'Holbrook v. Henderson (1851, N. Y. Super.) 4 Sandf. 619; Wilson v. Blanco
(i88g) 56 N. Y. Super. 582 and criticism of this case in i Westlake, Int. Law,
265-266.
'In the United States, secs. 4o63-4o64 of the Revised Statutes. In Great
Britain, the Act of 17o8 (7 Anne c. 12) applied in the principal case. See also,
for foreign legislation, Odier, Des privileges des agents diplomatiques, 53-78.
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While, in principle, the immunity from judicial process cannot be
waived by a Minister, at least without the consent of his government,
exceptions have been introduced in various classes of cases in which
the Minister has acted in his personal and unofficial character. The
most usual cases of this kind arise in civil law countries where the
Minister has engaged in trade or commerce, or where he has con-
tracted obligations in a fiduciary capacity as guardian, administrator
or trustee.7 An exception is also made in cases involving local real
property held by the Minister as a private individual. By the United
States Instructions to Diplomatic Officers8 this immunity is narrowed
still further by a provision that not only real, but also "personal
property, aside from that which pertains to him as a Minister,
is subject to the local laws."
The broad provisions of the British Statute of 7 Anne c. 12 extends
the immunity of foreign envoys from compulsory civil jurisdiction
even to cases arising out of commercial transactions in which they
may have engaged.9 And even in cases where by reason of his volun-
tary submission jurisdiction is assumed, as in the principal case, the
court's process by way of execution or sequestration will not, by virtue
of the above mentioned Statute extend to any of his property, whether
necessary to his official character or owned by him solely as a private
individual.10 Thus, it would seem that in England and probably in
the United States, where the liberal provisions of the statute of 7 Anne
have been substantially adopted,1" the property of foreign diplomatic
envoys, official or private, is exempt from seizure on execution.
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SEGREGATION ORDINANCES
The constitutional aspects of race conflict problems are again brought
up by Buchanan v. Warley (1917) 38 Sup. Ct. 16.1 Overruling the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky, the Federal Supreme Court held a
Louisville segregation ordinance unconstitutional, as depriving citizens
of property without due process of law. "In effect, premises situated
. . . in the so-called white block are effectively debarred from sale
to persons of color, because if sold they cannot be occupied by the
purchaser nor by him sold to another of the same color." 2
'See Hershey, Essentials of Int. Pub. Law, 289.
" (1897) Sec. 47, p. 19, 4 Moore's Digest of Int. Law, 646.
'Magdalena Steam Navigation Co. v. Martin (1859, Q. B.) 2 El. & El. 94;
i Oppenheim, Int. Law (2d ed.) 465.
"See Taylor v. Best (x854) 14 C. B. 487; Sno.w, Cases on Int. Law, go.
'U. S. Rev. St. Secs. 4063-64.
Is. c. below (I915) i6s Ky. 559, i77 S. W. 472; see (igis) 25 YALE LAw
JouRNAL 8r.
'The ordinance classified the blocks on the basis of the relative number of
residences, places of abode, and places of public assembly occupied in each block
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The line of cases culminating in Buchanan v. Warley gave a new
twist to race conflict problems. Hitherto the decisions on such ques-
tions have turned on the point of discrimination. So, for example,
with the establishment of a negro's right to be tried before a jury from
which men of his own race have not been, as such, excluded, whether
the exclusion be by legislation,3 or by discrimination in administering
a statute fair on its face.4 So, too, with the fruitless attacks on statutes
requiring "separate and equal accommodation" for the two races-in
schools5 and in public conveyances.6 The Supreme Court was, how-
ever, ready to find such discrimination when a statute authorized
sleepers and diners to be provided for white persons without corre-
sponding accommodations for colored persons-however slight might
be the demand from the latter class. 7 Legislation forbidding inter-
marriage between persons of white and black blood," or laying severe
penalties on fornication and adultery where the offenders were of
different race,9 was attacked on similar grounds, but was upheld. Dis-
crimination, finally,-deprivation of rights and liberties because of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude-is the issue on which
the disenfranchisement cases have sought a square decision, with
varying results.10
But in the principal case the plaintiff was a white man, a landowner,
seeking to enforce against a negro a contract for the sale of land made
subject to the purchaser's liberty under the law to occupy the premises,
which liberty the Louisville ordinance would destroy. All the segrega-
tion legislation, indeed, since the original Baltimore ordinance in 1911,
has been carefully drawn to avoid any question of discrimination by
applying to whites and blacks alike.1 But the earlier ordinances were
found to exceed the police power as being in some respects unreason-
able in their provisions. North Carolina found one out of keeping
by the different races. This discussion follows the court in spealing only of
"residences" to include all the above.
It is to be noted that the last phrase in the passage quoted must mean "sold so
as to convey the privilege of occupancy."
'Strauder v. West Virginia (1879) ioo U. S. 303.
Ex parte Virginia (1879) lOO U. S. 339.
'Roberts v. City of Boston (1849, Mass.) 5 Cush. i98; People v. Gallagher
(1883) 93 N. Y. 438; and see, as to private schools, Berea College v. Common-
wealth (i9o6) 123 Ky. 2o9, 94 S. W. 623.
'Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) 163 U. S. 537, 16 Sup. Ct 1138.
'McCabe v. Atchison etc. R. Co. (914) 235 U. S. 151, 35 Sup. Ct 69.
'State v. Gibson (I87i) 36 Ind. 389, cited and approved, Plessy v. Ferguson,
supra, 545; and see Keen v. Keen (i9o4) 184 Mo. 358, 83 S. W. 526.
'Pace v. Alabama (1882) io6 U. S. 583, I Sup. Ct 637.
" Cf. Anderson v. Myers (igio, C. C. Md.) 182 Fed. 223, with Atwater v.
Hassett (igo) 27 Okla. 292, Ill Pac. 8o2. On this question of disenfranchise-
ment see Julien C. Monnet (1912) 26 HARv. L. RFv. 42.
' Cf. State v. Gurry (1913) 121 Md. 534, 546, 88 At. 546, 55i.
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with the public policy of the state.1 2 Even where they were welcomed
as useful and desirable for the purpose of reducing race friction and
promoting race purity in congested city districts, the courts found one
fault in them fatal: they did not respect the full property rights
existing at the date of passage.1 3  Though a man already had the
legal privilege of residing on certain land, his privilege was cut away
if the land lay in an area forbidden to his race, and he had not yet
moved in. It may be questioned how far this legislative deprivation
of pri ilege is more stringent than the concededly valid denial to
liverymen' 4 or liquor dealers 5 of the use of their premises in certain
districts for the only purpose for which they bought. Be that as it
may, the ordinance in the present case was drawn to avoid that diffi-
culty: it was expressly left free to anyone to exercise whatever privi-
lege of residence, etc., he possessed at the time of enactment.
16
Invalidity in the principal case, then, arises not out of denial of
user to present owners, but out of restriction of the power of aliena-
tion. Alienation is the extinguishment in the present owner of all the
legal relations which go to make up ownership, and the creation of a
full new set of corresponding relations in the new owner.
17 If the
power to alienate the legal interest in certain premises includes the
power to create in another just such legal relations with regard to
those premises as the alienor himself enjoys, it is clear that the ordi-
nance in question does seek to cut down that power. Where the land
lies, e. g., in a "white block," the owner himself has the privilege of
occupancy; he can extinguish his own privilege by selling to a negro,
but he can no longer create a corresponding privilege in a negro
vendee.
2State v. Darnell (1914) i66 N. C. 3oo, 81 S. E. 338.
"
3State vz. Gurry, supra; Carey v. City of Atlanta (95) I43 Ga. 192, 84 S. E.
456. In Coleman v. Town of Ashland (191s) 117 Va. 692, 86 S. E. 139, the court
drew this same distinction, declared the ordinance invalid as to rights, etc., exist-
ing prior to its passage, but upheld it as to those accruing subsequently.
For a more drastic attempt at segregation, requiring even established residences
in the forbidden district to be vacated, see In Re Lee Sing (i89o C. C. N. D.
Cal.) 43 Fed. 359. And see note 16.
" Cf. the principal case, p. 18.
State v. Ball (igog) ig N. D. 782, x23 N. W. 826.
'After the Louisville ordinance bad been held valid (see note i) Atlanta tried
again, borrowing the Louisville text; this time the Georgia court upheld the
ordinance. Harden v. City of Atlanta (1917, Ga.) 93 S. E. 40. It was distin-
guished from that in the Carey case, supra, as not disturbing rights already
vested. The present discussion seeks to show that such a distinction is mislead-
ing, vested rights, etc., being disturbed in any such case. But there might be
tenable ground for differentiation in the varying value of the landowner's loss
under one or the other form of ordinance. See note 22, infra.
' So in the case of simple bargain and sale; the new relations differ somewhat,
even in their sum, from the old, where the new estate is divided-for example,
a life estate with remainder over.
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But may it not be doubted whether this cuts down the owner's
market for unimproved real estate further than would a fire regula-
tion forbidding the erection in a certain district of any but stone
houses?18 None would then be able to buy for residence purposes
but those whose cash or credit was sufficient for a stone house; the
governmental action would "effectively debar sale" to persons whose
pocketbook lacked a certain fatness. And the question which the court
finds presented in the instant case would be rephrased: "May the
occupancy, and, necessarily, the purchase and sale of which occupancy
is an incident, be inhibited by the states, or by one of their munici-
palities, solely because of the financial standing of the proposed occu-
pant of the premises?"'9 Undoubtedly, yes, where public policy
demands; yes, as well, where the sole objection is the proposed occu-
pant's actual or proposed business. Nor is it clear that the evils from
intermingling of the races in crowded residence sections are less than
those arising from the liquor traffic, nor of less importance to the
public.
Neither does the power by contract of sale to create each of the
property relations in a person of another race seem more sacred and
immutable20 than that other power which a statute may destroy: the
Cf. First Natil. Bk. v. Sarlis (189x) z29 Ind. 201, 28 N. E. 434.
""Solely because of the color," the opinion reads, p. 18. This phrasing of the
question does not fairly present the question involved in the case. It stresses-
or over-stresses-one of the confficting interests, that of the property owner, but
opposes to it not the community interests it must be weighed against, but the
proposed yardstick of classification. Yet the justification for such legislation lies
not in the fact of one man's color or financial inability, but in the interest of the
public to keep down the danger of fire, or of amalgamation, on the one hand, and
race friction, on the other. Any yardstick reasonably suited to the purpose
should be held good, as it has been in the school cases.
It is submitted that underlying the illogic of the court's question and whole
opinion there is an inchoate sense of rebellion against extending such exercise of
the police power as practically confiscates much of the value of a man's property.
The legality of such exercise is indeed established by the cases; but would not
some proceeding in the nature of eminent domain better satisfy our present idea
of justice?
' Compare the language in State v. Darnell, supra, quoted in Carey v. City of
Atlanta, supra, 2oo, with that of Justice Lumpkin's admirable special concurrence,
ibid. 202. Rights, etc., cannot be immutable or absolute They are creations of
society, exist only where and while society exists, and change with society's
changing complexion. Even so-called natural rights are merely those, counter-
parts of which are conferred by most of the societal groups known to us. If,
therefore, the community sense ever insistently demands, for instance, a certain
restriction of the power to alienate residences, sooner or later that restriction will
force its way into the law. Cf. Prof. Arthur L. Corbin, The Law and the Judges
(1914, Jan.) YALE R mw. It will be noted that Harden v. City of Atlanta,
supra, brings the Georgia court substantially into the position marked out pre-
viously by Lumpkin, J.
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power by marriage contract to create in oneself, and a person of
another race the whole of the complex relations of marriage."'
Where a segregation ordinance. is drawn, then, to apply similarly
to members of both races, and where ptiblic policy justifies its passage,
22
analogy would seem to show that no undue strain on the police power
is required to sustain such restriction of rights, privileges, and
powers as is occasioned by the ordinance. The more certainly would
it seem that Kentucky and Virginia were sound in upholding such
legislation where it cut off only privileges of occupancy accruing after
enactment. None the less the decision in the principal case is, unfor-
tunately, conclusive that for the time being the interests of the public
in race segregation are in law outweighed by those of landowners
whose power of alienation segregation would restrict; city residence
districts must still be tailored in pepper-and-salt, and not in checks.
STATE VERSUS FEDERAL RULES AS TO PRICE RESTRICTIONS
A recent decision by the court of chancery of New Jersey presents
a novel aspect of the much-discussed subject of price-fixing agreements
as restraints of trade. A statute of that state' prohibits, among other
acts discriminatory against the good will of another's business, price
inducements extended by dealers in violation of the terms of printed
notices accompanying the goods from the hands of the manufacturer.
In the principal case watches manufactured in New York were sold
to jobbers in New Jersey, each watch bearing a notice as to its retail
Some cases go so far as to hold an inter-race marriage invalid, although it
was good by the ler loci celebrationis. So State v. Tutty (189o, C. C. S. D. Ga.)
41 Fed. 753.
'Here, in the present state of the law, is the real crux in police power cases.
The interests of him who suffers must be balanced against those of his neighbors
and those of the public at large. The up-shot of the balancing will show the
ordinance reasonable or unreasonable; distinguishing segregation in crowded
centers, for instance, from that in thinly peopled country. Even then, previous
decisions-whose dicta are cited to support this I-show that the unreasonableness
must be flatfooted to justify action by the court. Booth v. Illinois (I9o2) 184
U. S. 425, 2 Sup. Ct 425. For a criticism of the principal case on similar
grounds, see (I917) I6 MIcH. L. REv. iog.
",,t shall be unlawful for any merchant, firm, or corporation to appropriate
for his or their own use a name, brand, trade-mark, reputation, or good-will of
any maker in whose product said merchant, firm, or corporation deals, or to dis-
criminate against the same by depreciating the value of such products in the
public mind, or by misrepresentation as to value or quality, or by price induce-
ment, or by unfair discrimination between buyers, or in any other manner what-
soever, except in cases where said goods do not carry any notice prohibiting
such practice and excepting in case of a receiver's sale, or a sale by a concern
going out of business." N. J. Laws of I916, c. i9o7.
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price. The defendant was a retail dealer who acquired the watches
from the jobbers. It was held that the manufacturer was entitled to
an injunction against a violation by the defendant of the terms of the
price-fixing notice. R. H. Ingersoll & Bro. v. Hahne & Co., ioi Atl.
(N. J.) io3o.
In upholding the statute and construing it as applying to the fixing
of wholesale and retail prices by the manufacturer, the court vigor-
ously challenged the doctrine of the federal Supreme Court in the Dr.
Miles Medical Co. case2 that such price-fixing arrangements by con-
tract are in unlawful restraint of trade at common law. The merits
of this controversy do not primarily concern us.3
A more serious question for our purpose is whether this controversy
was open to the New Jersey court or to the New Jersey legislature.
The court unquestionably regarded its decision as in conflict with
those of the Supreme Court of the United States on the common law
'Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons (191) 220 U. S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct 376;
Bauer v. O'Donnell (1913) 229 U. S. 1, 33 Sup. Ct. 616; Motion Picture Patent
Co. v. Univ. Film Co. (1917) 243 U. S. 502, 37 Sup. Ct 416; Straus v. Victor
Talking Machine Co. (1917) 243 U. S. 490, 37 Sup. Ct. 412; (see on the last two
cases, COMMENT in (1917) 26 YALE LAw Jouma.L 600); Ford Motor Co. v.
Union Motor Sales Co. (,917, C. C. A. 6th) 244 Fed. 156. See also "Price
Restriction on the Resale of Chattels," by William J. Shroder, 25 HAxv. LAW
REV. 59.
'For the arguments in favor of the validity of such agreements see the princi-
pal case; Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons, supra (dissenting opinion of
Holmes, J.) ; Garst v. Harris (19oo) 177 Mass. 72, 58 N. E. 174; Fisher Flour-
ing Mills Co. v. Swanson (1913) 76 Wash. 649, 137 Pac. I44; Walsh v. Dwight
(1899, N. Y.) 40 App. Div. 513, 58 N. Y. Supp. 91; Coln. v. Grinstead (19o)
iii Ky. 203, 63 S. W. 427; Elliman & Sons Co. v. Carrington & Sons [19oi]
2 Ch. 275; Nat. Phonograph Co. v. Edison-Bell Consol. Phonograph Co. (C. A.)
[i9o8] i Ch. 335. See also Grogan v. Chaffee (igog) 156 Cal. 611, io5 Pac. 745,
and Ghirardelli Co. v. Hunsicker (19r2) 164 Cal. 355, 128 Pac. io41.
It is submitted that the decisions which ignore the arguments in favor of the
validity of such agreements mark a reversion to an old condition of rigid rules
governing this subject prior to the decision of Nordenfelt v. Nordenfelt Co.
(H. L.) [1894] A. C. 535, and in particular that the reasoning which limits the
protection of good will to the case of a purchase of an established business is an
artificial deduction from the incidental fact that the general doctrine of restraints
of trade happened to reach its maturity with respect to this class of cases. See,
for example, opinion of Hughes, J., in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons,
supra, and article in 25 HAxv. LAw REv. 59, supra. No reason exists for assum-
ing the classification by Taft, J., in U. S. v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. (1898,
C. C. A. 6th) 85 Fed. 271, 282, to be exhaustive. The nature of the subject is
such as to preclude the possibility of an exhaustive classification.
For the "rule of reason" as applied generally, see also Central Shade Roller
Co. v. Cushman (1887) 143 Mass. 353, 9 N. E. 629; Meyer v. Estes (1895) 164
Mass. 457, 464, 41 N. E. 683; United Shoe Machinery Co. v. Kimball (19o7)
193 Mass. 351, 79 X. E. 79o; Leslie v. Lorillard (1888) 11o N. Y. 519, 18 N. E.
363.
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issue involved.' No attempt was made, or could be made, to distin-
guish the case in favor of the validity of the contract, as such, under
the federal decisions. No pretense of an actual agency between the
parties existed as in the recent case of Ford Motor Co. v. Boone, Inc.
5
The relation of the parties, if contractual at all, was not more dearly
so than in the Dr. Miles Medical Co. case. The fact, mentioned in
the opinion, that the goods were unpatented, manifestly could not help
the case in favor of validity. In a few brief sentences the question
was dismissed as to whether the statute of the state was inconsistent
with, and therefore overridden by, the Sherman Law.
7
This decision could not have been based on the ground that such
contract as there may have been did not relate to interstate commerce.
The price-fixing scheme, if it was such, affected shipments across state
lines as clearly as did those in the Dr. Miles Medical Co. case. Yet
the last named authority, while not bringing into prominence the Sher-
man Act, expressly bases its decision in part upon a determination of
what was prohibited by that statute.8  This leaves open no sliding
scale of legality dependent upon the diverging local rules of reason-
ableness. The sole question is, therefore, can a state legislature com-
mand the performance of certain acts which the federal laws have
forbidden the parties to contract, or combine, or conspire to do?
If this were an attempt by a state to validate a contract rendered
invalid by federal legislation, the answer would be too obvious for
discussion. Such contracts are past all question subject to the inter-
state commerce power. That power has been exercised by Congress.
No more directly incompatible legislation could be conceived than an
attempt by a state to impose a new and inconsistent rule of validity
applicable to interstate and intrastate contracts alike.
Can the legislature, however, interpose after the goods have reached
the New Jersey dealer, and become mingled with the general mass of
commodities subject to local jurisdiction,
0 and then compel the per-
formance of the very acts which the parties could not have contracted
to do, this coercion operating not by way of the enforcement .of a
contractual obligation, but by the creation of a new, independent, non-
contractual, statutory duty--a rule of conduct merely, to which the
'See principal case, p. 1O3 I .
'(1917, C. C. A. 9th) 244 Fed. 335.
'See opinions in Motion Picture Patent Co. v. Univ. Film Co. and Straus v.
Victor Talking Machine Co., supra.
" See principal case, p. 1O32.
'See Dr. Miles etc. Co. v. Park & Sons, supra, 4o9.
Gibbons v. Ogden (1824, U. S.) 9 Wheat. i; Co. of Mobile v. Kimball (i88o)
1O2 U. S. 691; Wisconsin v. Duluth (1877) 96 U. S. 379; Manchester v. Mass.
(i8gi) 139 U. S. 240, i Sup. Ct 559.
" See Brown v. Maryland (1827, U. S.) 12 Wheat. 419 and Crowley v. Christen-
sen (18go) 137 U. S. 86, 11 Sup. Ct 13.
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domestic dealers must submit as well as to all other regulations against
infringements of the trade rights of others?
We must carefully differentiate two distinct lines of decisions.
Numerous cases have accorded to the states the power to exercise
certain police functions affecting interstate commerce incidentally and
only measurably, and operating only when the acts of Congress are
silent.'1  Such are the pilotage cases, 12 the quarantine cases,13 and
those involving intrastate carriers constituting parts of a larger inter-
state nexus of transportation.1 4 In these cases the failure of Congress
to legislate and the moderate degree of the interference are both
important criteria of the constitutionality of the state legislation.
But another important class of cases exists where no such limitation
of degree is recognized with respect to the state power, and where
the presence or absence of congressional legislation of a contradictory
purpose is of no importance. Such are the decisions giving to the
states the full power to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors after
removal from the original package, although the effect of such exercise
of power is to render valueless a privilege of importation guaranteed
against state interference. 5  Similar instances are those of state
powers of taxation of imported goods after they have lost the char-
acter of imports,8 or the power to tax' 7 or prohibit"" the manufacture
of an article intended for transportation in interstate commerce. The
examples could be multiplied hypothetically. 9 Not merely has the
state these powers, but no one would seriously ascribe to Congress,
under the interstate commerce clause, the power to take them away by
legislation. Moreover, the extent to which the legislation may inter-
fere with a purpose of the interstate commerce power is an irrelevant
inquiry. The single decisive question is, has the interstate transaction
begun, or if begun has it terminated, at the time that the police power
of the state attempts the exercise of its function?
Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. (1829, U. S.) 2 Pet. 245; Cooley v.
Board of Wardens (1851, U. S.) 12 How. 299; New York v. Miln (1837, U. S.)
ii Pet. 102; Gilman v. Philadelphia (1865, U. S.) 3 Wall. 713, 727; Escanaba
Co. v. Chicago (1882) io7 U. S.-678, 2 Sup. Ct. 185.
" Cooley v. Board of Wardens, supra.
'Morgan v. Louisiana (1886) 118 U. S. 455, 465, 6 Sup. Ct 1114.
"Chicago, etc. Ry. v. Iowa (1876) 94 U. S. 155.
Crowley v. Christensen, supra.
" Brown v. Maryland, supra.
'Coe v. Errol (1886) 116 U. S. 517, 6 Sup. Ct 475; Diamond Match Co. v.
Ontonagon (19o3) 188 U. S. 82, 23 Sup. Ct 266; U. S. v. Knight Co. (1895)
156 U. S. I, 15 Sup. Ct 249.
"Bartemeyer v. Iowa (1873, U. S.) 18 Wall. 129; Kidd v. Pearson (1888) 128
U. S. i, 9 Sup. Ct 6.
" Thus Congress has complete control of the subjects of immigration. Hender-
son v. New York (1875) 92 U. S. 259. Yet no one would deny to the state the
exclusive power to legislate respecting the civil rights of aliens to a degree
rendering the Congressional policy abortive within the state jurisdiction.
COMMENTS
Obviously the principal case, if upheld, must fall in this the latter
class of decisions. The protection of the good will of an established
business is incontestably a legitimate object of the exercise of the police
power of a state, yet its exercise in this instance approaches in effect
the actual undoing of the positive dispositions of Congress. Has the
interstate transaction ended at the time that the act of New Jersey
comes into application? The conduct of the wholesale and retail
dealers after the receipt of the manufactured product, is, taken by
itself, plainly outside the sphere of interstate commerce in its most
liberal sense. Not merely had Congress not enacted that they should
not observe the terms of the accompanying notices but it undoubtedly
could not impose such a restriction upon intrastate commercial conduct.
It is, as we have seen, no novelty to the law that this limitation of
power may sometimes render the purposes of federal legislation liable
to be defeated by state legislation intervening after the subject-matter
has passed from federal control.
But other difficulties remain. If, for example, the contract as such
is void under the federal law, but the printed notice may be effectual
under the state law to accomplish the purpose of the manufacturer or
producer, is the act of sending the notices itself a violation of federal
law? Is an intention to contract or combine or conspire to accomplish
his purpose necessarily presupposed in an attempt to avail himself of
the rights accorded by the law of the state? Does the party who buys
goods accompanied by the printed notice participate by virtue of that
act in an illegal combination? To answer these questions affirmatively
would be tantamount to an admission that the price-fixing combination
or conspiracy which is in its totality an interstate transaction is not
completed until its purpose is effected, and that state legislation inter-
vening prior to this point of time is void.2 0 But is not the intention
to contract or combine in a price-fixing scheme quite distinct from the
intention to avail oneself of the non-contract right or to subject on-
self to the non-contract duty created by the statute of a state requiring
observance of the terms of a price-fixing notice, and may not the latter
exist entirely apart from the former, however difficult of determination
the question of fact may be? It is submitted that this situation of
fact is entirely possible, and, if it exists, the right and duty created by
state law are in no true sense a part of an antecedent combination or
conspiracy, that the interstate transaction is, from every possible view-
point, closed, and that the state is, from that point forth, sole judge of
its commercial policy.
The inconsistency in purpose in this case, however, must not be
exaggerated. Prohibitions of restraints of trade, common law or
statutory, do not decree that restraints of trade shall not exist but that
'Swift & Co. v. U. S. (195o) 196 U. S. 375, 25 Sup. Ct 276; Nortlern
Securities Co. v. U. S. (904) 193 U. S. 197, 338, 24 Sup. Ct. 436.
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individuals by their private acts, pursuant to their own judgments of
business expediency, shall not have the power to create them. A state
statute enacting a new and comrpulsory standard of trade morality, in
itself creating what from the standpoint of federal law is a restraint
of trade, does not, except in its ulterior aspects', contravene or frustrate
their purpose.
It may be urged that a recognition of this state power concedes an
unlimited opportunity to frustrate interstate commerce legislation, or
in particular legislation against restraints of trade. If a state can,
pursuant to the domestic policy of protecting business good will,
require the performance of acts which federal legislation was intended,'
not to forbid, but to prevent, can it also resolve upon a policy
requiring the performance of all acts which parties have contracted,
though in violation of federal law, to perform? Such an inquiry
ignores the essential distinction between a domestic policy which inci-
dentally frustrates a purpose of the interstate commerce power, and a
domestic policy which consists merely in the frustration of such pur-
poses. The latter might well be held not to be an exercise of the
police power at all. The present statute, however, has a purpose clearly
bringing it within the former class.
We conclude, therefore, that the decision in the principal case is
correct, both with respect to the rule of policy enunciated, and with
respect to the power of the state to establish that policy.
C. R. W.
